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A Neo-Gramscian Account of Carbon Markets: The Case of the European 
Union Emissions Trading Scheme and the Clean Development Mechanism 
Elah Matt and Chukwumerije Okereke  
 
Abstract 
Commodification of carbon defines much of the efforts to address global climate change. 
Despite growing evidence of ineffectiveness and inequitable outcomes, a range of market-
oriented instruments dominate the global climate-governance landscape. These tools reflect 
more broadly the central logic that underpins much of economic, social and political 
governing around the world. Focusing on the European Union Trading Scheme (EU ETS) 
and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), we offer a neo-Gramscian interpretation of 
carbon markets and cognate climate change policy instruments. We indicate how the 
limitations of these markets are highlighted by contestations for climate justice across 
different geographies. We suggest that while market mechanisms for climate solutions 
across scales of governance may have served well to recruit disparate interests into the 
global climate change management project, chances for radical emission reduction will 
remain very slim, unless there is a dramatic shift in the current social order of production 
and concomitant ideological, material and organizational practices.  
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1. Introduction  
Over the past decades, carbon commodification has emerged as the chief solution for 
addressing global climate change. To this end, a range of ‘new’ (Jordan et al., 2003), often 
market-based, policy instruments have been deployed across many jurisdictions and hailed 
as credible approaches for addressing climate change (Ellerman and Harrison, 2003; Victor 
et al., 2005; Wara and Victor 2008). Emission trading schemes, Joint Implementation (JI), 
regulatory-compliant and voluntary carbon markets, corporate targets, rating and disclosure 
are some notable examples of these market-creating environmental policy instruments.   
Despite increasing popularity, the legitimacy and effectiveness of these instruments 
are vigorously challenged, and counter-measures dot across the climate governance 
landscape (Fuhr and Lederer, 2009; Hoffmann, 2011; Paterson, 2009). Agitations over 
climate justice, or more broadly the demand for just transitions to a low-carbon society, 
provide a platform for articulating the ineffectiveness of these market-based practices and 
challenging their orthodoxy (Hayward, 2007; Lohmann, 2008; Okereke and Dooley, 2010). 
Across different geographies of scales, scholars and advocacy groups, as well as practical 
experience, are highlighting the inherent contradictions and inequitable outcome of carbon 
markets (Bachram, 2004; Bond, 2011; Borger, 2012; Burkett, 2008). At the same time, the 
effectiveness and economic efficiency of market approaches to climate governance, which 
have been their main selling pitch, have also been brought under question (Bohm et al., 
2012; Lohmann, 2006). 
Regardless of these potent challenges and contradictions, there is little ground for 
optimism that states or civil society will press ahead to devise radical regimes that will lead 
to significant decarbonization of the global economy in the near future. The main reason is 
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that a commitment to “The Good Life", defined mainly in terms of economic growth and 
continued capital accumulation, runs deep in the consciousness of both the producers and the 
receptors of carbon pollution and climate impacts.  
In this chapter, we offer a neo-Gramscian perspective for understanding the 
emergence and persistence of carbon markets as key instruments for addressing global 
climate change. We argue following Gramscian insights that the introduction and prevalence 
of carbon markets is best understood in terms of as a compromise among competing societal 
and political actors, which though presented as working to the benefit of all, nevertheless 
continues to serve the interest of the most powerful configuration of actors. Central to this 
explanation is the Gramscian concept of hegemony, as well as cognate notions such as war 
of position, passive revolution and the historical bloc. All of which are explained in the 
following section. 
Utilizing the neo-Gramscian perspective, we examine the European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and Kyoto’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) as 
prominent case studies of the marketization and subsequent dilution of key climate 
governance instruments. The EU ETS is interesting for at least two reasons. Firstly, it is one 
of the highest profile climate instruments, implemented at multiple levels of governance, and 
the largest functioning carbon trading scheme globally (Braun, 2009). Secondly, tracing the 
policy process of the scheme allows us to examine over two decades of developments in EU 
and international climate politics. The CDM is equally a representative programme, which 
held a lot of promise for reconciling the need for flexibility in emissions reduction 
approaches on the one hand, and technology transfer and sustainable development on the 
other hand. Since the EU ETS and the CDM are emblematic of broader developments in 
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international climate politics, they offer a powerful snapshot of the difficulties in creating an 
effective climate regime to date, and possible future developments in the governance of 
climate change.  
 
2. Introducing a neo-Gramscian political economy approach  
Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) developed Marxist political theory in a bid to explain the 
relative political stability of Western European political society in contrast to the communist 
revolutions in Eastern Europe. Some of his most influential work was written in the Italian 
prison, and was therefore often fragmentary and difficult to interpret. Still, Gramsci 
managed to convey some important concepts which furthered Marxist political thought 
(Mouffe, 1979). Gramsci’s work has also inspired generations of political theorists and 
International Relations scholars (Bieler and Morton, 2001; Cox, 1981; 1983; 1996; Jessop, 
1990; Mouffe, 1979; Showstack Sassoon, 1982; 1987 to name a few), who drew on his work 
to develop a range of neo-Gramscian perspectives (Bieler and Morton, 2001). The strength 
of neo-Gramscian approaches lies in their ability to explain relations of power among a 
multitude of public and private policy actors, and across multiple spatial scales. These 
approaches examine the role of material, organizational and discursive practices in shaping 
societal relations of power. Particularly insightful and analytically useful are the notions of 
hegemony, the historical bloc, passive revolution and war of position.  
The majority of neo-Gramscian scholars agree that Gramsci’s main contribution to 
political theory lies in his understanding of hegemony (Cox, 1981; Femia, 1981; Forgacs, 
1988; Levy and Egan, 2003; Mouffe, 1979). Gramsci adopted this notion in order to explain 
how economic interest groups gained and maintained dominance in modern capitalist 
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societies without the need for overt class struggle. Contrary to the realists’ understanding of 
hegemony that emphasizes state-centred coercive hierarchy; and World-System approaches 
that emphasize material hierarchy and class domination, a neo-Gramscian account of 
hegemony posits a far more complex and dialectical relationship between the elite, state, and 
civil society, based on ideological and consensual leadership (Wittneben, et al, 2012).  
For Gramsci, hegemony is successfully established when a dominant class links its 
interests with those of subordinate classes, in the pursuit of a social order that reproduces its 
own dominant position. In other words, hegemony is effectively established when the 
interest of the dominant class is accepted as the universal interest of society (Cox 1983; 
Gramsci 1971: 181). This implies that the state-elite need not enforce discipline by coercion. 
Rather, hegemonic stability is rooted in consensus and manifested in the legitimacy and 
universal acceptance of the core material, ideological, and social logic underpinning the 
polity.  The result is a common social and moral language, an inter-subjective identity that is 
supportive of the prevailing order, and one dominant concept of reality “informing with its 
spirit all modes of thought and behavior” (Gill, 2003:58). 
Thus, while hegemony is rooted in the economic sphere, it is expressed in the realms 
of civil society and its institutions (Anderson, 1976; Bates 1975: 353-357). The church, 
media, academia, NGOs, trade unions and other civil society institutions all perform a 
crucial role in promoting and perpetuating the order through ideological acquiescence and 
performances (Showstack Sassoon, 1987). Civil society, in Gramscian terms, is not an arena 
of social and industrial activity separate from political life. It is rather a state–society 
complex, the ideological superstructure, which, through its institutions and ideological 
functions, creates and diffuses dominant modes of identity and thought. This kind of 
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consensus is made possible because a large part of this state-society complex have come to 
accept the hegemonic project as their own, even though in critical terms the project serves to 
reproduce the dominance of the ruling elite (Levy and Newell, 2005). To this end, Gramsci 
applied the notion of the extended state, which comprises civil society and political society 
(Davies, 2011).  
 Gramsci referred to the alignment of social groups and the concomitant material, 
organizational and discursive practices as the historical bloc. A historical bloc is configured 
of state authority, economic dominance and civil society legitimacy. It is more than the 
alliance among these groups; it is also ‘the specific alignment of material, organizational, 
and discursive formations that stabilise and reproduce relations of production and meaning.’ 
(Levy and Newell, 2005: 50). Of particular importance in shaping the historical bloc are 
organic intellectuals (Gramsci, 1971: 3; Bieler, 2002: 581; 2006: 124). These intellectuals 
are ‘organically linked to a specific social group’. They include politicians, scholars, 
journalists, industry representatives and members of NGOs (van Apeldoorn, 2002: 30-31). 
Organic intellectuals give each social group ‘homogeneity and an awareness of its own 
function, not only in the economic but also in social and political fields’ (Gramsci, 1971: 5; 
see also Levy and Egan, 2003: 808-9). These actors ‘frame transformations in a way that 
make sense to the public at large’ (Andrée, 2011: 176). 
 Although dominance rests in the leadership and acquiescence of the state-society 
complex, these institutions simultaneously constitute the key site of political contestation, 
primarily because of their partial autonomy from the economic structures and bureaucratic 
authority of the state. From a neo-Gramscian perspective, civil society therefore has a dual 
role: it is at one time a part of the “extended state”, complementing the disciplinary and 
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universalizing tendency of the capitalist state, and at the same time an arena for counter-
hegemonic discourses and struggle (Levy and Newell, 2002: 87).  
Hegemony is thus contingent and accommodative. Power is neither static nor zero-
sum, but resides in part in the strategies and discursive ability of constituent groups and 
institutional entrepreneurs. There is plenty of room for manoeuvres and reconfigurations of 
interests, coalitions and alliances. Ultimately, however, transformational reform possibilities 
are limited and firmly circumscribed by the economic superstructure and moral ideologies, 
favouring existing power hierarchies. A hegemonic order thus evolves through dialectical 
processes of contestation and compromise among competing societal groups (Bieler, 2002: 
581; Jessop 1982, 142; van Apeldoorn 2002, 20; van Apeldoorn et al., 2003: 36-37). 
Political power is concurrently maintained through compromises and alliances.  
Gramsci distinguished between the strategies employed by the dominant class, and 
those employed subordinate groups. The war of position, often employed by subordinate 
groups, entailed gaining influence through action within civil society.  It ‘constitutes a 
longer term strategy, coordinated across multiple bases of power, to gain influence in the 
cultural institutions of civil society, develop organizational capacity, and win new allies’. 
(Levy and Newell, 2005: 51). The war of position therefore requires building alliances, 
organizational capacity, and germinating alternative ideologies in the institutions of civil 
society (Femia, 1981: 52; Showstack Sassoon 1982: 113; Simon, 1991: 75).  
In contrast, passive revolution strategies are often deployed by the dominant class to 
capture, redirect or neutralise the impetus for radical change (Forgacs, 1988: 224; Morton, 
2007: 97). Gramsci (1971: 115) described the passive revolution as ‘the political form 
whereby social struggles find sufficiently elastic frameworks to allow the bourgeoisie to 
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gain power without dramatic upheavals’. The concept refers to social, economic and 
political reforms which occur through consent rather than coercion (Adamson, 1980: 186; 
Cox 1983: 129). It relates to the ‘reorganisation of economic, political, and ideological 
relations, often in response to a crisis that maintains the passivity of subordinate groups, and 
the separation of leaders and led’ (Jessop, 1982: 150; see also Showstack Sassoon, 1982: 
129). Passive revolution relies on ‘extensive concessions’ (Levy and Newell, 2005: 51) that 
forestall more comprehensive challenges from other social groups, and thus serve to 
reproduce the dominance of the hegemonic group (Rupert, 1993: 81).  
The starting point for our analysis is that climate change poses (or at least once 
posed) a threat to the operations of the “carboniferous” (Paterson and Dalby, 2009) historical 
bloc. This bloc is dominated by fossil-fuel reliant fractions of capital, such as oil and car 
companies, electricity producers, and the cement industry. The operations and profitability 
of these groups are challenged by demands for climate-change mitigation and 
decarbonisation of the economy (Newell and Paterson, 2010). They are therefore ‘highly 
interested in the type and character of mitigation measures and strategies taken by 
governments’ (2011: 9). The historical bloc also comprises allies in governments, civil 
society groups and organic intellectuals; and concomitant material, organizational and 
discursive practices (Levy and Newell, 2005). Given this scenario, we suggest that much of 
climate politics across geographical scales will consist mainly in efforts, on the one hand, by 
progressive coalitions to implement effective climate change policies, and on the other hand, 
by the carboniferous bloc to de-radicalize and possibly “game” emergent climate 
governance regimes.  In our view, this approach outperforms competing alternatives for 
explaining climate policy process and change such as those that emphasize diffusion and 
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policy learning (Braun, 2009), state-based entrepreneurial leadership (Hovi et al., 2003 
Skjærseth and Wettestad, 2010), policy innovation (Voß, 2007), advocacy coalition 
(Michaelowa, 2008), and policy windows (Buhr, 2012). While these approaches offer useful 
insights, their main weakness as Stephan aptly puts it is that “they do not problematize the 
power structure at play” neither do they take serious “account of the material or discursive 
structural context” underpinning the design and implementation of given policies.  
Our analysis compliments a number of neo-Gramscian interpretations of 
environment and climate change governance, which have emerged in recent years (Levy and 
Egan, 2003; Newell, 2008: 522; Okereke et al., 2009; Stephan, 2011). We draw inspiration 
from these works and aim to further a neo-Gramscian understanding of climate change 
governance. Particularly relevant is Stephan’s (2011) analysis of the EU ETS which 
provides an excellent starting point for our chapter. We draw on his work and extend it both 
theoretically, by examining in more detail the notion of the war of position, and empirically, 
by adding the case study of the CDM. Furthermore, we provide an assessment of the 
effectiveness of these climate instruments, and a justice critique.  
 
3. The EU ETS  
The EU ETS was the first international carbon market and remains the largest emission 
trading scheme operating globally (Braun, 2009). To date, the EU ETS encompasses over 
11,000 industrial constellations and power plants in 31 countries (DG Climate Action, 
2013).  
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The need for EU action on climate change emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
following increased awareness and public pressure. From the outset, the EU considered a 
range of ‘new’ environmental policy instruments (Jordan et al. 2003; 2005). Particularly, a 
carbon tax was envisioned as the most desirable policy instrument (Jordan and Rayner, 
2010), while the idea of emission trading was not favourably looked upon. However, 
between 1991 and 1999, the EU ‘turned from a sceptic and opponent of emission trading 
into the biggest advocate for the policy tool’ (Stephan, 2011: 3). Since 2005, the EU turned 
emissions trading into its flagship project for tackling climate change.  
We examine the evolution of the EU ETS in three phases. In the first, from the early 
1990s, advocacy for emissions trading emerged mostly among US-based Environmental 
Non-Governmental Organisations (ENGOs) and their close associates in the academia 
(Dudek and LeBlanc, 1991; Hahn and Stavins, 1995; Stewart and Wiener, 1992). In the 
second stage, from the mid-1990s, this instrument gained popularity globally, but not yet at 
an EU-level. In the third phase, from 1998 onwards, the EU actively promoted the uptake of 
an emissions trading scheme. We examine these developments using the Gramscian notions 
of war of position and passive revolution. 
Emissions Trading as a War of Position 
A number of factors conspired to influence the proactive stance of the EU on climate change 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Firstly, EU-based ENGOs, such as Greenpeace and 
Friends of the Earth, were quick to embrace and popularise the science of climate change 
and related potential social impacts. They were organised in their advocacy and role as 
policy entrepreneurs at the EU-level and internationally. These organisations played a major 
role in organising some of the first wave of international conferences on climate change, 
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such as the World Conference on the Changing Atmosphere in Toronto in June 1988, and 
the 1989 Hague and Noordwijk Conferences (Paterson, 1996). Secondly, there was generally 
a high level of environmental awareness among the European public, following 
controversies around acid rain, the depletion of the Ozone layer and long-range 
transboundary air pollution (Sprinz, 1992). Subsequent treaties and policies resulted in 
growing confidence that the EU can design effective measures to manage challenging 
environmental problems. Another important factor was the influence of green parties in 
Europe, and environmentally-progressive Member States, such as Germany, the Netherlands 
and Denmark (Jordan and Rayner, 2010).  
 Ahead of the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, the EU went to extraordinary length in a bid 
to adopt a package of policy instruments to address climate change (Jordan and Rayner, 
2010). The Commission recommended a combined carbon and energy tax (CEC, 1992) as 
the main element of this scheme (Haigh, 2011). It was hoped that these efforts would lend 
the EU an international ‘climate leader’ status, alongside economic and regulatory 
advantages emanating from the promotion of a low-carbon economy (Wurzel and Connelly, 
2011). Despite initial gusto, the idea of a carbon tax was aborted due to institutional and 
political barriers. Particularly, business groups were able to rely on their privileged position 
and access to politicians in order to mount a successful lobby against this policy instrument, 
which threatened their economic operations (Braun, 2009; Stephan, 2011).  
Governing climate change posed a threat to the operations of many fractions of the 
capitalist class, and particularly those relying on fossil fuels for their operations and 
profitability. European companies, mindful of public opinion and the positive intent of the 
European Commission, largely sought a consensual approach to this policy problem. In 
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contrast, the immediate response of their American counterparts was to form advocacy 
groups to mobilise against climate action. Perhaps the most notable example of such 
platforms was the Global Climate Coalition (GCC). The GCC was dominated by oil 
companies, carmakers and other fossil-fuel-dependent corporations, whose business models 
were threatened by climate change mitigation efforts (Levy and Newell, 2005; Stephan, 
2011). A cardinal tool in their strategy was to question the scientific understanding of 
climate change. In so doing, they sought to attack and destroy the basis of common belief 
and subjectivity which framed the problem of climate change. Furthermore, they indicated 
that prevailing efforts to tackle climate change would lead to economic crises, poverty and 
scarcity. In so doing, they appealed to the deep and pervasive desire for economic prosperity 
among the population, and the need to ensure continued capital accumulation within the 
carboniferous bloc. The multi-national nature of these corporations ensured that business 
actors coordinated strategies across the Atlantic. Thus, business groups were largely 
opposed to action on climate change. 
The promotion of emissions trading schemes to address climate change emerged 
among a number of US-based ENGOs. As discussed by Simons and Voß earlier in this 
book, the advocacy of emission trading grew amongst organic intellectuals from the 1960s 
onwards. Following the inclusion of the SO2 and NOx trading scheme in the US 1990 Clean 
Air Act, the Environmental Defence Fund (a renowned US climate-advocacy NGO), 
alongside other US-based ENGOs, such as the Centre for Clean Air Policy (CCAP),  
promoted emissions trading as a means for addressing climate change. The CCAP was later 
also particularly instrumental in promoting the uptake of an emissions trading scheme in the 
EU (Braun, 2009: 478; Stephan, 2011: 10). Although emission trading was essentially a 
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market-creating, neo-liberal policy instrument, it was advocated by these civil society actors 
in a bid to gain support for action on climate change (Stephan, 2011). From a neo-
Gramscian perspective, therefore, the advocacy of an emissions trading scheme can be 
understood as a war of position undertaken by these ENGOs in order to ensure 
acknowledgment and acceptance of climate change as a legitimate policy problem.  
 
 
Emissions Trading: From War of Position to Passive Revolution 
Meanwhile, the EU continued its efforts to introduce policy instruments to address climate 
change, but to little avail. In 1995, ahead of the first Conference of Parties of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Berlin, the Commission published a 
working paper setting out options for a Community Climate Strategy (CEC, 1995). The 
document showed continued support for a carbon tax, and other cost-effective measures to 
reduce CO2 emissions, through which the EU would assume an international climate 
leadership role (Haigh, 2011). The document encapsulated the ecological modernisation 
win-win discourse, through which the promotion of environmental protection would 
encourage economic growth and political leadership (e.g. Weale, 1992, Hajer, 1995). In 
practice, however, little progress was made on introducing EU-wide climate instruments 
(Jordan and Rayner, 2010 Wurzel and Connelly, 2011). The EU opposed an Emissions 
Trading Scheme, as it feared that European citizens would perceive this instrument as 
legitimizing pollution. 
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The international popularity of emission trading schemes increased around the mid 
1990s. International organisations such as the OECD, the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the International Energy Agency (IEA) supported 
emissions trading as their instrument of choice in addressing climate change (Braun, 2009). 
In the US, positive experience with the SO2 and NOx trading scheme encouraged the US 
government to include this instrument in the negotiations of an international climate change 
treaty (Stephan, 2011).   
 Concurrently, the attitude of business groups towards climate change in general, and 
emissions trading in particular also shifted. As international climate efforts grew, some 
business groups adopted more accommodating approaches towards climate change. A 
milestone change occurred in May 1997, when BP publicly acknowledged the threat of 
climate change and joined forces with Environmental Defence Fund to develop a company-
wide emissions trading scheme (Levy and Egan, 2003; Stephan, 2011: 11). Shell similarly 
broke rank with the GCC and announced an internal emissions trading scheme. The win-win 
ecological modernisation discourse was increasingly adopted among business groups, who 
also undertook organizational and material efforts to accommodate the threats of climate 
change to their financial operations (Levy and Egan, 2003; Levy and Newell, 2005).     
These strategic moves were important in many respects. First, they provided the 
opportunity for companies to gain material capacities in implementing emission trading. 
Secondly, they created a new discourse through which companies and their products were 
portrayed as ‘green’, thus enhancing their corporate image. Thirdly, they created new 
organizational capacities within companies and through alliance-building with counter-
hegemonic environmental groups, as well as fostering cooperation with policy makers (Levy 
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and Egan, 2003; Levy and Newell, 2005). Fourthly, by investing in emissions trading, 
companies effectively acted to avoid the implementation of more controversial and 
potentially more harmful policy instruments for their operations, such as command-and-
control and fiscal regulations (Akhurst et al, 2003: 657; Stephan, 2011: 11). Indeed, oil 
companies were instrumental in setting the agenda for emissions trading both at the EU and 
at Member State levels (Braun, 2009: 473). The acceptance of emission trading schemes 
ensured continued political and public support for the operations of some of the most 
climate-harming industries. Thus, it can be understood as a Gramscian passive revolution, 
which served the continued hegemony of the carboniferous historical bloc (Stephan, 2011).  
The Uptake of the EU ETS and the Rise of the New Climate Block 
The Kyoto Conference of the Parties in 1997 marked a turning point in the EU's attitude 
towards emissions trading. In order to ensure US cooperation on an international climate 
treaty, the EU accepted emissions trading and other flexible climate instruments (Braun, 
2009: 472). EU-based environmental NGOs, which were largely opposed to this instrument, 
were also left with no option but to accept emissions trading as a legitimate instrument to 
address climate change. In order to maintain some influence over the design and 
implementation of a trading scheme, they participated in the negotiations and design of the 
EU ETS (Stephan, 2011). The co-optation of this subordinate group into the emerging 
hegemonic project, is understood by Stephan (2011: 15) as a strategy to prevent ENGOs 
from ‘organizing a successful opposition or counter-hegemonic movement to emissions 
trading or carbon markets'. Thus, a carbon-accommodating project emerged across 
horizontal and vertical levels of governance, and a coalition of economic, political and 
environmental actors ‘became a hegemonic bloc’ (Stephan, 2011:12).  
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 Concurrently, from 1998, the EU adopted a proactive approach to introduce an 
emissions trading scheme (Braun, 2009: 477).  In March 2000, the Commission published a 
Green Paper on an EU-wide emissions trading scheme (CEC, 2000). From the publication of 
the Green Paper, it took the EU institutions a relatively short period of time until the EU 
ETS Directive was adopted by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament in 
October 2003, and the first stage of the EU ETS began in January 2005. The EU ETS is now 
in the third phase of implementation. Yet, it poses many challenges in governing climate 
change, as discussed in Section 5. The following section turns to provide a neo-Gramscian 
analysis of the CDM.  
4. The Carbon Development Mechanism: The War of Positions 
Although the actors and ‘battle ground’ are slightly different, the development of the carbon 
development mechanism has many parallels with the EU ETS. The CDM is one of the three 
market mechanisms alongside the emission trading, and joint implementation (JI) 
established under the Kyoto Protocol for governing climate-change mitigation. Basically, the 
CDM allows companies from the industrialized countries (those that have binding emission 
reduction target under the Kyoto agreement) to invest in emission reduction activities in 
developing countries (these do not have legally binding reduction targets under the Kyoto 
Protocol). The ‘additional’ carbon saved through such investment is rewarded by Certified 
Emission Reduction units (CER), which can then be subsequently monetized or used to meet 
industrialized countries’ emission reduction obligations, including those of the EU ETS 
(Newell and Paterson, 2010).  
In addition to the CDM, there is also the voluntary carbon offset (VCO) scheme 
which is not regulated by any central intergovernmental body. Voluntary Carbon Offset, as 
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the name implies, is a loosely coordinated set of schemes which allows individuals and 
organizations (usually in developed countries) to pay a premium for their carbon-polluting 
activities, such as industrial emission or flying an aeroplane. These premiums are then spent 
on climate-mitigating activities in the Global South, such as planting a tree. Both schemes 
(CDM and VCO) rely on the argument that since it is materially irrelevant where carbon is 
reduced (from a global perspective), it was necessary to give developed countries flexibility 
in meeting their legally-binding emission reduction obligations under the Kyoto Protocol.  
With the rise in awareness of climate change in the late 1980s, developing countries 
were very quick to point out that there was a huge asymmetry in the contribution and 
vulnerability to climate impact between countries (Agarwal and Narain, 1991; Guha 
Martinez-Alier, 1997). Specifically, they argued that while developed countries were largely 
responsible for causing climate change, it was the less-developed countries that will bear 
much of the negative impacts (Dasgupta, 1994). In addition, developing countries drew 
attention to existing problems of poverty and underdevelopment in their countries. They 
argued that it was unfair for them to be expected to sacrifice their development aspirations in 
a bid to mitigate climate change (Hayes, 1993). Developing countries were adamant that any 
action to deal with climate change be conditional on financial and technical assistance from 
the industrialised countries (Dasgupta, 1994). In fact, they argued that global efforts to 
address climate change must be used a means of addressing wider and underlying issues of 
global inequality (Bodansky, 1994; Paterson, 1996). To this effect, measures such as global 
carbon tax on fuel, aviation, shipping as well as the idea of some form of global carbon 
stamp duty were mooted (Grubb, 1995).  
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Through these discursive and rhetorical devices developing countries effectively 
framed climate change as an issue of global justice and equity. In so doing, they took a 
strategic stand in the emergent war of position. Early calculations suggested that several 
hundreds of billions of dollars will accrue to developing countries in the form of North-
South financial and technology transfers (Grubb, 1989; Hayes, 1993).  While these transfers 
were in crucial terms of the monetary value involved, their real significance lay in the threat 
they posed to the hegemonic neo-liberal ideology, with its inbuilt averseness to 
redistribution, especially among nations. In essence, if the expectations by developing 
countries were to eventuate such that the global climate change regime sanctions massive 
North-South transfer; such actions that would violate the fundamental norms of neoliberal 
economic philosophy, enthrone the ideal of global justice and significantly disturb the 
configurations that characterise the historical bloc. In this sense, the war of position 
launched by developing countries and sympathetic voices from the North represented a 
serious threat that needed to be pacified or “accommodated” in Gramscian terms.   
Passive Revolution: From Carbon Fund to Global Carbon Markets 
The industrialized countries were rattled by the coherent articulation of the global 
distributional implications of climate change (Parks and Roberts, 2008). Arguments for 
North-South climate justice were presented with passion and in provoking terms by 
developing country politicians and their ideological demagogues. One such publication was 
by Agarwal and Narain (1991), which argued that global policies that neglect concerns for 
North-South distributional equity amount to nothing short of “environmental colonialism.” 
However, while recognizing the intuitive appeal of international climate justice, 
developed countries were determined to either side-step or at least significantly dilute 
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practical distributional responsibilities in terms of North-South transfers (Dasgputa, 1994; 
Paterson, 1996). To this effect, they made the argument that population growth in the South 
and widespread corruption was the cause for widespread poverty in developing countries. 
Some even suggested that developing countries were acting like “kleptocrats” seeking to use 
their numerical advantage to extort money from the industrialized nations (Okereke, 2008). 
Others invoked historical ignorance of the negative impacts of carbon pollution and on that 
basis argued that it was unfair, as it is said in philosophical parlance, “to punish sons for the 
sins of their parents” (Caney, 2005; Jamison, 2001; Vanderheiden, 2005).  
In the run up to the Kyoto agreement, Brazil tabled an elaborate “Climate 
Development Fund” proposal, which called for large sums of money to be set aside by the 
industrialized countries on an annual basis for the purpose of funding climate investments 
and the acquisition of ‘clean’ technology by developing countries. This proposal was widely 
supported by the rest of the developing countries including the G77 and China. However, 
the North and the business lobby were vehemently opposed to this idea. Their main 
argument was that such a Fund was contrary to the spirit of free market capitalism and the 
protection of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) (ENB, 1997). The EU opposed the Fund, 
suggesting that it offered a loophole that could render emission targets in the North 
meaningless (ENB, 1997: 2). A lack of agreement on this item proved one of the most 
important obstacles to negotiating a Kyoto Accord (ENB, 1997).  
When developed countries perceived the strength of the argument for climate justice 
and corresponding agitation over North-South financial and technology transfer, they 
changed tactics – from outright opposition to a set of accommodative strategies. A major 
step in this strategy was the establishment of an informal long-running bilateral contact 
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between Brazil and the US to discuss the Clean Development Fund (CDF) and find common 
grounds. In addition, a few developed countries, such as South Korea and Australia, started 
making unilateral pledges to promote the development of clean technology and innovation 
centres in developing countries, especially the nations perceived to be most vulnerable to 
climate change.  The aim was in part to break the solidarity of developing countries and 
encourage a more bilateral and fragmented approach to North-South climate investment, 
technology transfer and capacity building. After a series of exclusive talks between Brazil 
and the US, the proposal for the CDF was eventually changed to a Clean Development 
mechanism (CDM), which was perceived to be far more flexible and business friendly (see 
also chapter by Newell).  
Since its inception in 2001, when the first CDM project was registered, till date, the 
CDM has issued over 1 billion CER. Interestingly, a vast proportion of these projects have 
been in China and Brazil – the country that had championed the state-based climate 
development Fund. However, prices for CER have fallen steadily since 2012 and have been 
very low since January 2013. Alongside the CDM, the much smaller voluntary carbon 
market (carbon offset) has also grown. It is estimated that over USD800 million of carbon 
offsets, representing 125 million metric tons of CO2-equivalent reductions, were purchased 
in 2008. Despite this flurry of carbon trading activities, the value of CDM and VCO in 
reducing emission or facilitating equity and sustainable development have been very 
dubious. Many feel that the transformation of the Brazilian proposal from its original focus 
on a North-South financial transfer to market mechanism represented a very successful 
move by the industrialized countries to take the sting off the proposal and turn it into an 
accumulation instrument for business and industry actors in the North.  
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5. A Neo-Gramscian Assessment of Instruments  
Ineffectiveness and Contestations of Justice 
Both the EU ETS and the CDM have proved controversial measures for addressing climate 
change. The implementation of the EU ETS has been difficult and beset with controversies. 
Initially, Member States were responsible for the allocation of pollution permits. Industry 
lobbying resulted in favourable conditions for industry (Lederer, 2012). To illustrate, the 
actual CO2 emissions for 2005 were about 4% lower than the number of pollution permits 
allocated that year. Consequentially, carbon prices dropped drastically, reaching their lowest 
ebb in April 2007 (Calel, 2013; Skjaerseth and Wettestad, 2009: 114). The free allocation of 
permits resulted in windfall profits for energy producers and other industry sectors, which 
passed the speculative costs on to consumers (Skjaerseth and Wettestad, 2010: 105).   
During its second implementation phase (2008-2012), the number of allocated 
permits was tightened. CO2 emissions of EU ETS-related industries dropped during this 
period. However, much of the emissions reductions made during this period can be 
attributed to the financial recession that begun in 2008 and the resulting decline in polluting 
economic activity. Meanwhile, industry continued to make windfall profits from the scheme 
(Calel, 2013; Okereke and McDaniels, 2012). The recession also shaped the third 
implementation phase (2013-2020). In December 2008, the European Council of Ministers 
and Parliament agreed on a revised scheme. EU-wide allowances were auctioned instead of 
National Allocation Plans. Still, wide concessions were made to industry groups, with the 
mediation of Member States. For example, Poland managed to secure exemptions for its 
coal-powered electric plants, while Germany secured concessions for its energy-intensive 
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industries (Skjaerseth and Wettestad, 2010: 110). Thus, despite the tightening of the EU 
ETS in its third phase, it was estimated that there was still an over-allocation of permits 
(ENDS Report, 459 May 2013, p. 27).  
In April 2013, carbon prices fell to 2.63 Euros, their lowest since the 2007 carbon-
market crash. The reason for this crash was the European Parliament's rejection of a 
Commission Proposal to limit the number of permits auctioned between 2013 and 2015. The 
EU ETS was announced 'moribund as an emissions mitigation tool, if not quite dead' (ENDS 
Report, 459 May 2013, p. 27). The EU is still trying to resuscitate the ETS, yet obstacles to a 
functioning carbon market prevail. These difficulties also hinder certainty and long-term 
investments in ‘green’ technologies. Carboniferous fractions of capital therefore maintain 
their power through making windfall profits from the EU ETS, ensuring continued uncertain 
climate for investment in competing low-carbon technologies, and the relative regulatory 
freedom they enjoy under the EU ETS.  
The CDM and VCO have not fared any better, but have instead attracted a string of 
criticism.  It has been suggested that the CDM is an immoral instrument, in that it provides a 
cheap way for the rich West to avoid taking serious action on climate change (Lohmann, 
2006). Beyond this, there are strong suggestions that the CDM and VCO have provided 
opportunities for business interests in the North to dispossess communities in the poor South 
and engage in primitive accumulation (Bohm et al., 2012; Lohmann, 2006; 2009). In some 
instances, forests and lands which are vital for the survival of local communities in 
developing countries have been privatised and commoditised under the pretext of CDM 
(Lohmann, 2009). For these reasons, the CDM has in fact been described as an instrument 
for “carbon fraud and climate colonialism” (Bacharm, 2004). There is virtually no evidence 
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that the CDM has resulted in North-South technology transfer, or sustainable development, 
in line with the original vision of the Brazilian proposal.  Furthermore, there is little ground 
to suggest that CDM has resulted in substantial carbon reduction.  In fact, as of 1 June 2013, 
57% of all CERS had been issued for projects based on destroying either HFC-23 (38%) or 
N2O (19%) (UNFCC, 2013).  
By offering the means for the carboniferous bloc to allocate private property rights to 
nature and realise its value through the market, these instruments have more or less 
reinforced hierarches and patterns of domination between the poor and rich (see Bumpus 
and Liverman, 2008: 144). Yet, they have been very successful in creating a sense of 
government and industries’ climate proactivity, drawing in a large number of diverse groups, 
including otherwise progressive ENGOs, into a large climate coalition, shielding the 
carboniferous bloc from societal pressure. A good example is BP which suddenly became 
"Beyond Petroleum" and in doings so brought an air of greenness to some of the most 
climate-destructive fractions of capital.  
 
A Neo-Gramscian Critique 
The uptake of these carbon-market-creating policy instruments to address climate change 
can fruitfully be understood in terms of a neo-Gramscian passive revolution. Through these 
instruments, business and capitalist governments have neutralised the impetus for radical 
transformation that was originally associated with climate-change governance across 
geographies. Concerns regarding climate change have in effect been incorporated into the 
dominant carboniferous historical bloc. Still, incremental adjustments have been made by 
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this hegemonic project to address climate change, resulting in some material, organizational 
and discursive developments within the bloc.  
We term this mutated bloc the climate-accommodating carboniferous bloc. On the 
organizational level, this bloc is governed by an alliance among governments and public 
institutions at various spatial scale, business groups, and some mainstream ENGOs, 
alongside an emerging group of climate professionals (Voß, 2007; Stephan, 2011). On the 
material level, carbon markets have created favourable conditions for the continued 
accumulation of capital, both on regional and international levels. On the discursive level, 
the climate-accommodating bloc is fuelled by a green growth ideology. The green growth 
paradigm, which evolved from the earlier ecological modernisation discourse, provides a 
consensual ideological framework for continued capitalist accumulation. Newell and 
Paterson (2010: 1) describe this form of ‘climate capitalism’ as 'a model which squares 
capitalism's need for continual economic growth with substantial shifts away from carbon-
based industrial development'. In this view, investment in ‘cleaner’ technologies will 
stimulate the economy while promoting environmental protection and climate change 
mitigation. However, at its core this discourse does not challenge prevalent modes of 
production and consumption.  
The account provided in this paper highlights the difficulties in creating and 
maintaining a counter-hegemonic war of position. While the notion of passive revolution 
provides a useful analytical tool for understanding the strategies employed by the hegemonic 
group to secure its continued dominance, the concept of the war of position proves more 
elusive. Although US-based ENGOs were ultimately successful in securing 
acknowledgment of climate change as a global policy problem, they operated within the 
25 
 
prevailing neo-liberal hegemonic order and its pro-market ideology. Thus, ultimately, their 
environmental interests were incorporated into those of the climate-accommodating bloc. 
Similarly, in accepting to substitute direct funds with market instruments, the South was able 
to make the notion of North-South financial transfer politically palatable and acceptable to 
the North. In reality, however, the compromise has served not only to neutralize the radical 
content of the idea but also to present the hegemonic bloc with another opportunity for 
primitive accumulation. The challenge for new counter-hegemonic social movements is 
therefore to create an alternative ideological narrative, on which to build material and 
organizational capacity. However, challenging the prevailing hegemonic order is no simple 
task. The only certainty is that an alternative social narrative will be met with resistance and 
contestation of the hegemonic bloc, and will require long-term ideational, material and 
organizational efforts, spearheaded by progressive organic intellectuals.  
6. Conclusions  
Using the case studies of the EU ETS and the CDM, this chapter offered a neo-Gramscian 
analysis of carbon-commodifying policy instruments. Particularly, we emphasized the 
processes of contestation and compromise which shaped the social relations of production 
within the climate-accommodating carboniferous bloc. We argued that initially, both the EU 
ETS and the CDM could be perceived as attempted war of position strategies, carried out by 
subordinate social groups. The idea of an emission trading scheme to address climate change 
was perceived as a war of position deployed among US-based ENGOs in order to rally a 
more consensual disposition to climate change among business groups. The CDM was 
perceived as a war of position of the global South to achieve climate justice and 
redistribution of technological know-how. In both cases, we argued that the response to 
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these challenges can be fruitfully understood as a passive revolution, in which some 
concessions were made, but in a way that did not compromise the continued dominance of 
the hegemonic historical bloc.  
The results of these compromises, we argued, are eminent in the carbon-
accommodating historical bloc. This bloc is materially aligned with the creation of carbon 
markets and carbon-commodification. It is steered by an alliance of economic, political and 
societal actors, at various spatial scales. Discursively, this bloc is fuelled by the notion of 
green growth, in which the prevalent capitalist mode of production can peacefully co-exist 
with efforts to mitigate climate change. 
 We hope that this account will stimulate organic intellectuals who are currently 
putting their minds together to provide an alternative climate-accommodating narrative. In a 
neo-Gramscian view, this war or position will necessitate long-term efforts on the material, 
organizational and ideological levels. This is a long battle, in which subordinate groups may 
be incorporated into a dynamic, hegemonic historical bloc. However, the question whether 
Gramsci’s theoretical prescription for social transformation through the war of position can 
work in practice remains open.   
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